Jake Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison, eds., PROBABILITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION by Draper, Paul
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 30 Issue 4 Article 9 
10-1-2013 
Chandler & Harrison, eds., PROBABILITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
RELIGION 
Paul Draper 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Draper, Paul (2013) "Chandler & Harrison, eds., PROBABILITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION," Faith 
and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 30 : Iss. 4 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol30/iss4/9 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
470 Faith and Philosophy
This raises the metaontological question of what sort of criterion of on-
tological commitment Leftow is presupposing throughout the book. Al-
though he does not explicitly address the question, in a number of places 
it seems that he presupposes the customary view that we are committed to 
the existence of the values of variables bound by the first-order existential 
quantifier and to the referents of singular terms in sentences we take to be 
true (e.g., 77, 81, 96, 307, 480–481, 511). But this metaontological thesis is 
eminently challengeable and so cannot be merely assumed.
Against those who would challenge premise (10) in the argument 
above, Leftow argues that truth must have an ontology (24–25). But al-
though he speaks freely of truth-makers throughout the book, his under-
standing of truth-makers is so thin that the notion of truth’s having an 
ontology becomes utterly obscure. At one point Leftow asks whether, if 
there were absolutely nothing, it would be the case that 2  +  2  =  4. If you 
think not, then “you accept that the latter claim has some ontology” 
(25). What is the theist to make of this? If, per impossible, there were no 
God, then, I suppose, we might agree that nothing would be true. But 
truth’s having an ontology in this sense goes no distance toward show-
ing that the singular terms “2  +  2” and “4” have real world referents, 
whether divine thoughts or abstract objects. To characterize anti-realist 
solutions as “no ontology” solutions in so thin a sense is therefore highly 
misleading. They might perhaps better be classed as “safe ontology” so-
lutions—except that Leftow’s discussion of that option then fails to con-
nect with them. In short, as Leftow himself acknowledges, much more 
remains to be said about anti-realist solutions to the problem of God and 
abstract objects.12
12I’m grateful to Brian Leftow for his comments on the drafts of both my reviews.
Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Jake Chandler and Victoria S. 
Harrison. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 272 pages. $75.00 (hard-
cover).
PAUL DRAPER, Purdue University
The eleven essays in this collection cover six topics: miracles, design, evil, 
Pascal’s wager, religious disagreement, and faith. As expected, given the 
book’s title, all eleven apply probabilistic thinking to their topics. They 
are preceded by a helpful introductory chapter in which the editors, Jake 
Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison, summarize each essay and explain 
with forgivable hyperbole just how central probability theory has been 
to the philosophy of religion in the last thirty-five years or so. The essays 
are technical to varying degrees; some perhaps more than necessary, but 
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others—including some of the most technical ones—precisely as much as 
necessary. The essays also vary in how successfully they apply probabilistic 
thinking to their topics, but overall this is a valuable and well-edited col-
lection, one I recommend to philosophers of religion who are comfortable 
with mathematical probability.
The body of the book begins with three chapters on miracles, including 
one by Benjamin C. Jantzen provocatively titled “Pierce on Miracles: The 
Failure of Bayesian Analysis.” This essay criticizes Bayesian analyses of 
the evidentiary value of historical testimony about extraordinary events. 
For example, Bayesian analyses often involve making poorly supported 
judgments about the reliability of individual witnesses. This is not, how-
ever, a problem for Bayesianism per se, as Timothy McGrew and Lydia 
McGrew’s Bayesian analysis of testimony concerning miracles in the third 
chapter of the book demonstrates. On their well-defended view, the spe-
cific circumstances of the witnesses at the time they testify (among other 
things) are used to estimate a relevant Bayes’s factor instead of naïve ap-
peals to “principles of testimony” or risky speculations about the moral 
character or track record of the witnesses.
Jantzen’s main point is that Bayesian analyses of historical testimony 
are flawed because they don’t take into account the fact that history tends 
to preserve some testimony and not other testimony in a biased fashion. 
Specifically, testimony supporting the occurrence of extraordinary events 
is often much more likely to be recorded and preserved in the histori-
cal record than testimony supporting the non-occurrence of those events. 
The importance of this “sampling bias” will be overlooked if one sim-
ply updates the credence one gives to the occurrence of such an event 
by conditionalizing on the testimony itself, ignoring the historical process 
by which such testimony is transmitted to us. Jantzen does not believe 
that this specific problem has been addressed by Bayesians. That may 
be true, but the more general mistake of updating on information while 
ignoring the process generating that information has been addressed by 
Bayesians, and that mistake, while common, is clearly not essential to 
Bayesianism.
Luc Bovens (either by lucky coincidence or brilliant editorial inten-
tion) specifically discusses, from a Bayesian perspective, the importance 
of taking into account “protocols” or information-generating processes in 
chapter 4. His goal is to “vindicate James against Alston” on the issue 
of whether miracle-like events that happen to oneself provide (or can 
be reasonably taken to provide) much stronger evidence for God’s exis-
tence than high quality testimony about miracle-like events that happen 
to someone else. (William James says “yes,” and William P. Alston says 
“no.”) Roughly, Bovens’s main point is that when one comes to believe in 
God because such an event happens to oneself (like St. Paul on the road 
to Damascus), one typically lacks or is uninterested in base-rate informa-
tion about the infrequency with which such events happen, information 
that could lower the evidentiary value of the event since the occurrence 
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of some miracle-like events is inevitable in a naturalistic world with suffi-
ciently many events. In contrast, testimony about miracle-like events that 
happen to others often comes with information at least suggesting that 
such events occur no more often than one would expect by chance. This is 
a worthwhile point, though it may fall short of vindicating James against 
Alston, since one might hope that a very reasonable victim of a miracle-
like event would take the time to inquire about the frequency with which 
such events occur before doing anything drastic like converting to or help-
ing to create a new religion.
Speaking of seeking base-rate information, Richard Swinburne, a very 
reasonable theist if there ever was one, evaluates the multiverse objection 
to the fine-tuning design argument for theism in chapter 6. If sufficiently 
many and varied universes exist, then perhaps it is to be expected that 
some of them are fine-tuned for intelligent life even if God doesn’t exist. 
So stated, the objection seems much more straightforward than it really 
is. Swinburne digs much deeper, ultimately arguing that recognizing 
the possibility of a multiverse has very little impact on the force of the 
fine-tuning argument. In part this is because, unlike a theistic multiverse 
hypothesis, an atheistic multiverse hypothesis capable of accounting for 
fine-tuning would have to be very complicated and so extremely improba-
ble a priori. Swinburne’s chapter follows, quite appropriately, a very ambi-
tious chapter by David H. Glass on the broader issue of how to determine 
whether or not (or to what extent) design arguments are undermined by 
scientific explanations of apparent design that are compatible with theism. 
Multiverse explanations of fine-tuning are, of course, a good example 
of that.
In chapter 7, Richard Otte aims to show that “theists should not believe 
evil, or our ignorance of a good reason for God to permit evil, is evidence 
against religious belief or the existence of God, at all” (127). Unfortunately, 
this result sounds more impressive than it is, and it is more impressive than 
what Otte actually argues for. It is more impressive than what he actually 
argues for because, while he does argue for the position that neither the 
existence of evil nor our ignorance of a good reason for God to permit evil 
is evidence against a certain religious belief that he calls skeptical theism, 
he does not argue for the position that neither evil nor our ignorance of a 
good reason for God to permit evil is evidence against the existence of God. 
Skeptical theism is the hypothesis that “Evil exists and God has a good 
reason to permit it that we are not capable of understanding” (130). At the 
very end of his chapter, Otte appears to consider a hypothesis that is closer 
to theism simpliciter. According to this hypothesis, evil exists and God 
has a good reason, whether understandable or not, to permit it. He thinks, 
however, that the same results will be obtained because “skeptical theists 
hold [skeptical theism], and thus assign [non-skeptical theism] a very low 
probability” (141). Though Otte claims at the beginning of his chapter that 
his arguments do not presuppose a particular account of probability, this 
remark appears to presuppose that prior probabilities are subjective, as 
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does his otherwise inexplicable claim that any evidence against theism 
is “irrelevant” if it is not also evidence against a typical theist’s “religious 
beliefs as a whole” (129).
Otte’s focus on the hypothesis of skeptical theism instead of on theism 
is also one of the reasons why his thesis is less impressive than it sounds. 
Notice that this hypothesis entails that evil exists—and so evil is not evi-
dence against it—and it also entails that we are ignorant of a good reason 
for God to permit evil—and so such ignorance is not evidence against it. If 
only it were that easy to solve the problem of evil! Let’s ignore, however, 
the fact that he obtains his results by building the evidence into his reli-
gious hypothesis. A second, much more important reason why his results 
are less impressive than they sound is that the strongest arguments from 
evil are not arguments from the failure of theodicy—they are not based 
on the fact that we are ignorant of a good reason for God to permit evil. 
Nor are they based on the bare existence of evil. Instead, they are based 
on facts about the amount, kinds, and distribution of evils in the world.
Consider, for example, an evidential argument against theism based 
on the existence of horrific evils. It is crucial not to conflate such an argu-
ment with one based on our ignorance of a good reason for God to permit 
horrific evils. Given that God exists and that there are horrific evils in the 
world, it is not all that surprising that we don’t know God’s actual or po-
tential reasons for permitting those evils, as numerous skeptical theists 
have pointed out (though William L. Rowe has tried valiantly to show 
otherwise). Thus, our ignorance of a good reason for God to permit hor-
rific evils is not strong evidence against theism (though it would go too 
far to claim, as Otte apparently would, that it is not any evidence at all 
against theism). It does not follow, however, that the horrific evils them-
selves are not all that surprising given theism and so it does not follow 
that the horrific evils themselves are not strong evidence against theism. 
Otte recognizes that his points apply only to Rowean arguments from evil 
and not to these other arguments, but he just asserts (on 133) that these 
other arguments fail.
Michael Tooley’s Carnapian argument in chapter 8 of this volume is 
a good example of an evidential argument from evil that is not vulner-
able to any of Otte’s criticisms. Tooley’s thesis is that the occurrence of a 
large number of horrific events (like the Lisbon earthquake) makes God’s 
existence extremely unlikely. I cannot do justice here to the technically so-
phisticated argument that he offers in defense of that thesis, but for what 
it’s worth I will offer a brief caricature of his argument. Consider the action 
of choosing not to prevent an event like the Lisbon earthquake when one 
knows one has the power to prevent it. Clearly the known wrong-making 
features of such an action outweigh any known right-making features it 
has, feeble attempts at theodicy notwithstanding. Thus, since unknown 
right-making features are no more likely than unknown wrong-making 
features, and since the absence of both unknown right-making features 
and unknown wrong-making features will render the action wrong all 
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things considered based on its known moral features, it is probable that 
such an action’s total wrong-making features outweigh its total right-
making features and so the action is wrong all things considered. A very 
large number of events like this, however, have in fact occurred, and so the 
probability that in every single case the action of choosing not to prevent 
the event is rendered right all things considered by unknown right-mak-
ing features is extremely low. Therefore, since theism implies that every 
one of those actions is right all things considered, it follows that theism is 
also extremely improbable.
The topic of chapters 9 and 10 is Pascal’s Wager. Alan Hájek carefully 
reconstructs all three of Pascal’s formulations of the argument, arguing 
contra Ian Hacking that none of them are valid. He then offers two refor-
mulations that he believes to be valid. Both, however, assign a negative 
infinite utility to wagering against God, which Hájek believes to be incon-
sistent with Pascal’s theology. (There are two minor editorial glitches re-
lated to Hájek’s reformulations. In chapter 1, in their summary of Hájek’s 
essay, the editors mistakenly say that, according to Hájek, one of these 
reformulations is consistent with Pascal’s theology; and the heading on 
page 182 for the section on Hájek’s second reformulation says “Salvation 
has Infinite Utility, Damnation has Negative Utility” when it should say 
“Salvation has Finite Utility, Damnation has Negative Infinite Utility.”) In 
chapter 10, Paul Bartha addresses the famous many-Gods objection to the 
wager, arguing for the interesting thesis that the problems it creates for 
the wager argument are either resolvable or already present in the original 
one-God formulation of the argument.
Chapter 11 has a misleading title: “Does Religious Disagreement Actu-
ally Aid the Case for Theism?” The author, Joshua C. Thurow, makes no 
attempt to defend an answer to that question. Instead, his goal is to show 
that it could “well turn out” either that disagreement aids the case for 
theism or that it aids the case for atheism. So perhaps “Might Religious 
Disagreement Aid the Case for Theism or Atheism?” would have been a 
more accurate title. But even that might be a bit misleading, because it 
could also well turn out, consistent with everything Thurow argues for in 
the chapter, that disagreement aids the case for suspending judgment on 
God’s existence.
In the first three parts of the chapter, Thurow introduces, makes, and 
develops an interesting general point about the epistemology of disagree-
ment. Broadly speaking, Thurow accepts the “equal weight view” on this 
issue. On this view, when one disagrees with epistemic peers, one should 
give no more weight to one’s own judgment about the relevant evidence 
than to the judgments of one’s peers. One objection to the equal weight 
view is that it implies “spinelessness”: one would have to suspend judg-
ment about almost all interesting philosophical, religious, moral, and po-
litical issues. Thurow argues that the equal weight view does not have this 
implication. Instead, when epistemic peers disagree about the truth-value 
of p, the appropriate response to such disagreement will vary, depending 
BOOK REVIEWS 475
in part on the specific source of that disagreement and on the extent to 
which those peers agree about the impact of some of their shared evidence 
on p’s probability. For example, if the two sides agree that part of their 
evidence strongly supports p (or strongly supports the denial of p) and 
disagree only on the evidential significance of some other part of their 
evidence, then giving equal weight to each other’s views could result in 
rational agreement on p’s truth (or falsity). In the fourth and final part of 
the chapter, Thurow suggests optimistically that his point might very well 
apply to the disagreement between theists and atheists. That, however, 
would be very difficult to show.
The volume ends on a high note, with a splendid and cautiously titled 
chapter by Lara Buchak called “Can It Be Rational to Have Faith?” (my 
italics). The first half of the chapter develops a unified account of religious 
and non-religious faith. The second half attempts to specify the conditions 
under which faith can be practically rational. Buchak also briefly consid-
ers the issue of epistemic rationality, but only in a very weak (subjective 
Bayesian) sense.
By examining statements involving the word “faith” (both in religious 
and mundane contexts), Buchak arrives at the following six pre-theoreti-
cal desiderata. First, having faith involves taking some proposition to be 
true (even if one doesn’t believe it). Second, the truth or falsity of that 
proposition is important to the person who has faith. Third, that proposi-
tion is uncertain. Fourth, faith makes a difference to one’s behavior and 
so is linked to some action. Fifth, faith is action-relative—one can have 
faith relative to one action but not another. And sixth, faith involves going 
beyond the evidence in some way. She also seems to assume that faith is 
virtuous (or at least not vicious) insofar as she dismisses certain analyses 
on the grounds that they conflict with “religious ethics and the ethics of 
friendship” (229 and 230).
Here is a paraphrase of Buchak’s elegant formal analysis (234):
A person S has faith that X, expressed by act A, if and only if (i) S per-
forms A when there is some alternative act B such that S strictly prefers 
A&X to B&X and strictly prefers B&~X to A&~X, and (ii) S prefers to 
commit to A before examining additional evidence rather than to post-
pone a decision about A until examining additional evidence.
On this analysis, whether a given instance of faith is rational (in the practi-
cal sense) depends on two factors. First, the credence that the agent ought 
(in the epistemic sense) to give to the statement X must be sufficiently 
high to make the action A practically rational. Second, the willingness to 
commit to A without gathering more evidence must be rational, either (i) 
because the monetary, cognitive, or interpersonal costs of gathering such 
evidence or of postponing a decision to do A would be too great, or (ii) 
because one would rationally do A regardless of what new evidence one 
might gather, or (more controversially) (iii) because the risk of discovering 
evidence making it rational not to do A even though X is true is too great. 
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The issue of which instances of religious faith, if any, satisfy these two con-
ditions is beyond the scope of Buchak’s paper. It seems likely to me that 
some will, especially ones that have modest propositional objects and that 
are expressed by low cost actions. Less likely to pass muster, however, are 
instances of great faith, such as having faith that the Christian God exists 
and expressing that faith by an act of martyrdom.
It is worth mentioning in closing, if this is not already obvious, that 
many of the essays in this volume attempt to address controversial issues 
in philosophy of religion by first addressing controversial issues in confir-
mation theory or formal epistemology or decision theory. In some cases, the 
result is that the papers don’t get very far on the actual topics in philosophy 
of religion that allegedly motivate them. I don’t mention this as a criticism 
of the volume or of any of its essays, but I do hope that some of the talented 
authors of these essays regard their work here as initiating a research pro-
gram in the philosophy of religion instead of terminating one.1
1I am very grateful to my students, James Elliott, Jonathan Fuqua, and Mark Satta, for 
helping me with this review.
Moral Perception, by Robert Audi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2013. 194 pages. $35 (cloth).
MICHAEL FUERSTEIN, St. Olaf College
In this relatively compact volume, Robert Audi offers a substantive ana-
lytical treatment of moral perception, and situates it within a broader epis-
temological intuitionism that he has developed elsewhere. Audi’s primary 
thesis is that we can perceive moral properties, and that this capacity for 
moral perception plays a major role in moral judgment and knowledge. 
On Audi’s view, by establishing a capacity for moral perception, he has 
also established the possibility of both moral objectivity and the rational 
resolution of moral disagreement (4).
The first of the book’s two sections lays out Audi’s conception of moral 
perception and the primary arguments in its favor. Audi’s view is that we 
perceive moral properties by perceiving their physical “base properties,” 
i.e., the physical properties on which moral properties are “consequential” 
(39). Thus, when we perceive someone cheating on an exam, we do not di-
rectly perceive the moral property of injustice in the way that we directly 
perceive, say, the property of roundness. Instead, we perceive injustice in 
virtue of having perceived the ordinary physical properties that instantiate 
cheating in this case. Audi’s view thus aims to show how moral perception 
is possible while avoiding an ambitious form of moral naturalism, i.e., the 
view that moral properties are part of the natural order in just the same 
way that tables, chairs, and other familiar objects of perception are. Audi 
